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Abstract 
 
 
This working paper aims at better comprehending the populist phenomenon. By choosing the anti-
constitutionalist features of populism, the paper sheds light on the challenges posed by populism to 
constitutional democracy. This is the first step in formulating legal responses to the populist chal-
lenge. The DEMOS project is developing these responses. We divide the paper in four major sections. 
The first part analyses the key features of populist constitutionalism to assess whether it is possible 
to reconcile populist constitutionalism with contemporary constitutional democracy. We devote the 
second section to the European Union. In particular, we assess the instruments available to the EU to 
halt democratic backsliding in EU Member States, and how these instruments have been employed. 
In the third section, we investigate the concept of judicial populism by analysing the impact of pop-
ulist policies on the case law of ordinary courts. The last section contains policy suggestions for 
constitutional democracy to react to the populist challenge. 
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A. Executive summary 
 
The present DEMOS working paper assesses the impact of populism on the institutions of constitu-
tional democracy, including the European Union. It is structured along three distinct research areas.  
 
The first one focuses on how the counter-majoritarian institutions of contemporary constitutional 
democracy are affected by populism. In a nutshell, populist parties affirm the need to profoundly 
change democratic institutions in order to ensure the primacy of the people’s will, that they claim to 
represent. Yet, the populist attempts to reform the powers and system of appointment of judicial 
councils, constitutional courts, and independent authorities, evidence that these are ultimately aimed 
at placing these institutions under the control of the ruling majority. The claim supported in this paper 
is that the ultimate goal of populist parties is not to re-equilibrate the legitimacy of democratic insti-
tutions. Rather, it is to loosen any constraints on the ruling majority actions. This process also em-
braces parliaments, which have been one of the favourite targets of populist constitutionalism. In 
particular, populist parties often seek to reduce the number of MPs; — e.g. Czechia and Italy — or 
to significantly reduce the parliament’s competences, as happened in Hungary. Finally, this contempt 
for the the rule of law principles and the prerogatives of other institutions ultimately affects also the 
relationship between the people and the populist ruling majority. As the Catalan secessionist process 
demonstrates, the pretence of populist parties to embody the popular will generate a clash with the 
checks and limits of constitutional democracy, which counter-majoritarian institutions, in particular 
the constitutional court, have the duty to enforce. In order to curb the effects of populist politics on 
constitutional democracy, the main solution appears to be the involvement of a plurality of actors in 
all the decision-making processes, from the appointment of members of the judiciary and independent 
authorities to the constitutional revision procedure, requiring a substantial political consensus for its 
approval.  
 
The second strand of research analyses the role of the EU institutions. In particular, it investigates 
what are the instruments that should be deployed against anti-constitutionalist regimes in Member 
States.  
The aims of political instruments such as the Rule of Law Framework and Article 7 TEU procedure 
have proven largely ineffective, given their dialogical nature and the inevitable political deadlocks 
inherent in the Council decision-making process. This is why the research focuses mainly on the 
judicial instruments. More specifically, it investigates the common efforts of the Commission and the 
EU Court of Justice to use the infringement proceeding under Article 258 TFEU as a tool to ensure 
compliance with EU values — above all, the principles of effective judicial protection and of judicial 
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independence — via an innovative interpretation of Article 19 TEU. The latter strategy allows the 
EU not to act in a sanctioning fashion, but rather to present its intervention as a support for the dem-
ocratic institutions of a Member State, in particular the judiciary. 
 
The third strand of the research, which corresponds to Section 3 of the present working paper, inves-
tigates the phenomenon of judicial populism. Judicial populism is indicated in the attitude of a judge 
who ‘deliberately breaches the standards of proper legal reasoning in order to satisfy the presumed 
expectations of ‘ordinary people’. Judicial populism may manifest itself in constitutional or ordinary 
courts (‘everyday judicial populism’) and can assume different shapes. In particular, when a judge 
truly believes that he has to take into consideration the interests and opinions of ordinary people, then 
we talk of ‘honest populism’. Conversely, ‘strategic populism ’does not seek to satisfy public needs 
and sentiments. Rather, it serves as a shield that can help judges to accommodate the objectives of 
the ruling populist majority. A clear example is offered by Hungary, where since 2010 the govern-
ment has adopted a populist stance towards penal law and the judges have followed suit. A thorough 
investigation of everyday judicial populism in Central-Eastern European countries, which are the 
ones where judicial populism is more visible, allowed us to identify the main corrective answers to 
this phenomenon. Most notably, an effective lay participation in the administration of justice seems 
to be the best way to help judges take into account public sentiments without breaching the standards 
of legal reasoning, while providing an important factor of input legitimacy for the judiciary.  
 
 
B. Introduction 
 
The present working paper builds upon the results described in the report Institutional Context of 
Populism, which was submitted as a part of a previous DEMOS deliverable report (D2.2), which was 
published on the DEMOS website as a working paper.1 In that report the research focused on the 
institutional contexts that favour the rise of populist politics. In this regard, the present working paper 
constitutes a step forward to better comprehend the populist phenomenon. By choosing the anti-con-
stitutionalist features of populism, it sheds light on the challenges posed by populism to constitutional 
democracy. This would be the first step in formulating legal responses to the populist challenge, 
                                                 
1  See Working paper On the Institutional Context of Populism: https://openarchive.tk.mta.hu/423/.  
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which will be developed within the project work package 7. In order to reach this aim, the present 
document is divided in four main sections. 
The First Section analyses the main features of populist constitutionalism in order to assess whether 
it is possible to reconcile populist constitutionalism with contemporary constitutional democracy. 
The Second Section is devoted to the European Union. In particular, the Section assesses the instru-
ments available to the EU to halt democratic backsliding in EU member States, and how these instru-
ments have been employed.  
The Third Section is an investigation on the concept of judicial populism. More specifically, it anal-
yses the impact of populist policies on the case law of ordinary courts.  
The Fourth Section contains policy recommendations addressed to policy makers to better equip con-
stitutional democracy vis-à-vis the populist challenge. 
 
Before getting to the results of the research, a few preliminary remarks. First, the methodology best 
suited to answer the questions posed in the agreed DEMOS proposal is one based on a combination 
of analytical and empirical methods. In particular, the researchers used the relevant existing literature, 
legislative and constitutional acts, and case law to support their claims. Besides, the answers stem-
ming from a questionnaire drafted in a previous DEMOS task, constituted a pool of data. On the one 
hand, the data helped researchers identify the most relevant issues to be investigated. On the other, 
they served as a litmus test for the hypothesis elaborated in the normative analysis. The combination 
of these two methodologies is of great importance, as it allowed us to produce original research out-
puts, which will contribute to advancing the knowledge of how populism affects constitutional sys-
tems.  
 
Second, this working paper focuses on EU Member States that show a stronger presence of populist 
parties. Some of these — e.g. Hungary and Poland —already drawn the attention of EU institutions, 
while others, such as Czechia, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain, have been insofar ignored by the EU, yet 
are particularly worth investigating for having populist parties, as part of the national, regional o local 
governments, elaborated, proposed and in some cases enacted, reforms to the democratic system. 
 
Finally, although the present working paper is the product of a common effort of the partners partic-
ipating in a project task, supervised by the University of Barcelona (UB), each team has focused its 
investigation on a specific section. The UB team, composed of Prof. Josep Maria Castellà and Dr 
Marco Antonio Simonelli, has been responsible for the final draft of the present document and for the 
research work presented in sections 1 and 3.2. The team at the University of Copenhagen (UCPH), 
composed of Prof. Helle Krunke and Dr Sune Klinge, addressed the issues connected to the EU, 
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which is presented in section 2. The consortium coordinator team at the Centre for Social Sciences 
(CSS) in Budapest, composed of Prof. Zoltán Szente, Prof. Fruzsina Gárdos Orosz and Dr Mátyás 
Bencze, carried out the research on judicial populism, which is expounded in section 3.  
 
1. The anti-constitutional features of populism  
 
1.1 Introduction and methodological issues 
 
Populist constitutionalism, unlike constitutional populism,2 is not a fully-fledged constitutional doc-
trine.3 Rather, it consists of the different proposals concerning constitutional democracy, as excerpted 
from the populist narrative.4 Essentially, populists supposedly aim to enhance the representativeness 
of the constitutional system as a whole, and reaffirm the centrality of popular will, which they claim 
to embody. Reaffirming the needs for more democratic legitimacy of democratic institutions, may 
constitute a legitimate effort to re-equilibrate the democratic and constitutional dimensions of con-
temporary democracies. Constitutional democracy presupposes an ‘aspiration to a fair equilibrium ’
between, on the one hand, the democratic principle, embedded in the respective roles assigned to the 
legislator and the government in the decision-making process, and on the other hand the rule of law, 
expressed by the subjection of the policymakers to the laws and the constitution, enforced mainly 
through the judicial review of legislation.5 To this regard, it has already been pointed out in a previous 
working paper (i.e., On the Institutional Context of Populism) that some legal scholars see in populist 
                                                 
2 Constitutional populism is a doctrine originated in the 1990s in the United States and elaborated in the work Akhil Reed 
Amer, who once stated ‘I suppose if someone asked me, “What is your constitutional philosophy?” I might say that I am 
a constitutionalist, a textualist, and a populist’. The purpose of this doctrine was to correct the imbalance between the 
democratic and the aristocratic element of American democracy and advocated essentially for more instruments of dem-
ocratic participation and less activism from the side of the US Supreme Court. To put it otherwise, constitutional populism 
does not seek to overstep the boundaries of constitutional democracy but rather to correct its current equilibrium, by 
offering a textual reading of the Constitution. See: A. Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, 
and Populism, 65 Fordham Law Review (1997), 1657 ss; from another author: R. Parker, Here, the People Rule: A Con-
stitutional Populist Manifesto, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge), 1998;  
3 A political manifesto of this doctrine is the book of Ryszard Legutko, head of the PiS delegation to the European Par-
liament, vice-president of ECR Group and one of the most prominent intellectuals of the party. See: The Demon in De-
mocracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies, (Encounter Books, 2016).  
4 Some authors instead outlined the main claims of a populist constitutional theory. These are namely: 1) the prevalence 
of the rule of men over the rule of law; 2) the unity and immediateness of the people will 3) a strong accent on constitu-
tional identity. However, these more than proposals are a framework within which analysing the impact of populism on 
constitutional democracy. See: Luigi Corrias, Populism in a Constitutional Key: Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty 
and Constitutional Identity, 12 European Constitutional Law Review 1 (2016): 6–26. 
5 Maurizio Fioravanti, Constitución, (Trotta, 2011), 163-164. 
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constitutionalism a positive factor capable of redressing the lack of democratic legitimacy in contem-
porary democracies by stressing the importance of popular sovereignty.6 In particular, populist con-
stitutionalism points to two features of contemporary democracy, which are allegedly threatening its 
democratic legitimacy. First, a supposedly uncontrolled growth of non-majoritarian institutions, 
which manifests itself through judicial activism, especially from constitutional jurisdictions and, sec-
ond, a proliferation of independent authorities provoking a depoliticisation of the public sphere to the 
advantage of technocratic governance. The above-mentioned trends in constitutional democracies 
have been considered by some authors as a degeneration of democracy, labelling these trends as ‘ju-
ristocracy‘ and 7’technocracy’,8 respectively.  
 
Before assessing the practical effects of populist constitutionalism propositions, it is worth mention-
ing how legal scholarship tried to categorise the impact which populist reforms have on constitutional 
democracy. The categories that are being proposed to describe the effects of populism on constitu-
tional democracy are numerous, amongst them the most employed are: ‘constitutional coup’,9‘ abu-
sive constitutionalism’, 10‘  authoritarian constitutionalism’, 11  and ‘democratic regression ’or 
‘erosion’.12 The first concept, ‘constitutional coup’, refers to a situation in which the government, 
without formally breaking legality, through a series of perfectly legal moves, manages to achieve a 
‘substantively anti-constitutional result’.13 The term ‘abusive constitutionalism ’is employed when 
governing majorities make a formally legal recourse to the mechanisms of constitutional revision to 
erode the democratic order. ‘Authoritarian constitutionalism ’has been conceived as an intermediate 
                                                 
6 See working paper On the Institutional Context of Populism: https://openarchive.tk.mta.hu/423/ last accessed 20 October 
2020. 
7 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, (Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 
8 David Kosař, Jiří Baros and Pavel Dufek, The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Technocratic 
Governance and Populism, 15 European Constitutional Law Review (2019): 427-461. 
9 Kim L. Scheppele, Constitutional coups in EU Law, in M. Adams, A. Meuwese and E.H. Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism 
and the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, 448 ss. 
10 David Landau, Abusive constitutionalism, 47 University of California Davis Law Review (2012): 189 ss. 
11 Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 Cornell Law Review 2 (2015), 393 ss.; H. Alviar García and G. 
Frankenberg (eds), Authoritarian Constitutionalism. Comparative Analysis and Critique, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2019. 
12 Tim Ginsburg and A.Z. Huq, How to save a constitutional democracy, (University of Chicago Press, 2018). 
13 Kim L. Scheppele, Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions Can Strengthen Peak 
Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to Hungary), 23 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 51 (2014).  
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model between liberal constitutionalism and authoritarianism, where the government is still commit-
ted to respecting the constitution in force, but the standard of protection of rights guaranteed by the 
constitution is not comparable to that guaranteed in a liberal democracy.  
According to Tushnet, the first scholar who employed the concept, authoritarian constitutionalism 
corresponds to a situation in which there is an intermediate level of protection of liberal freedoms, 
but elections are substantially free. Finally, the most comprehensive conceptual category is that of 
‘democratic erosion ’or ‘democratic regression’, which can be defined as a situation in which there is 
a slow but substantial decay of all the three institutional prerequisites of liberal constitutional democ-
racy, namely free and fair elections, guarantees of liberal rights, and the respect for the rule of law.14 
Many of these categories are overlapping and, within the scope of this working paper, the most com-
prehensive one is adopted: democratic erosion. Independently of these labels, the ways to react to 
these phenomena from a constitutional point of view remain basically the same and they will be 
analysed in the concluding paragraph. 
  
Finally, these notions have to be kept distinguished from that of illiberal democracy. Firstly popular-
ised by Zakaria, the concept originally referred to a situation in which formal democracy is estab-
lished in a country lacking a liberal tradition.15 The term rose to the general attention when he was 
employed by Prime Minister Orban in his famous Băile Tuşnad speech of July 2014, where he 
straightforwardly affirmed that what he was trying to build in Hungary was  ‘a non-liberal state 
[which] does not deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc.. But it does not make this 
ideology a central element of state organization”.16 In any case, the term ‘illiberal democracy ’refers 
to the result of populist reforms rather than to the technique used to implement these reforms.  
 
 
 
As a last preliminary remark, a definition of the material scope of the research and its methodology 
is in order. As to the first, in order to assess how the propositions of populist constitutionalism are 
put into practice, this Section, and the working paper as a whole, has its focus on the political systems 
where populist parties are, or have been, in power. Therefore, the focus of this Section will be mainly, 
but not exclusively, on the Central Eastern European States (‘CEE States’), most notably the countries 
                                                 
14 Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, How to save a constitutional democracy, cit., 71.  
15 Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 Foreign Affairs, 6 (1997): 22-43. 
16  The English translation of the speech is available on the official website of the Hungarian government. See: 
https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-
the-29th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp last accessed 20 September 2020. 
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of the Visegrad Group, i.e. Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia (in descending order of rele-
vance). Concerning the methodology, the research builds upon the result of the investigation in WP 
2.4. More specifically, the questionnaire distributed among EU Member States national experts — 
most notably Q1-5 and 13-15 — had allowed us at a first stage to identify the main streams of the 
research, and subsequently to validate the results of the normative analysis conducted by the DEMOS 
researchers.  
 
1.2 Populist constitutionalism and non-majoritarian institutions 
 
1.2.1 Populism, ordinary courts and judicial self-governance 
 
In general, with the rise of populism, the role of ordinary judges in constitutional democracy has 
become one of the major issues of debate. Populist constitutionalism also challenges the ‘sophisti-
cated version of the rule of law ’adopted in the European context,17 inasmuch it envisages strong 
constitutional courts checking the legality of the acts of the political branches.  
 
Concerning the first aspect, the role of ordinary judges, populism, especially in Central Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, has put into the question the European model of judicial independence. In a nutshell, 
this model provides for a high level of independence for judges, both structurally and individually, 
ensured through a judicial council whose main scope is to protect the independence of the judiciary 
thus ensuring a separation of the judiciary from the other two branches. Generally, a limited political 
interference is admitted in the judicial council, where members of the parliaments and/or government 
participate, on a minority basis, in the appointment, promotion, and disciplining of judges. Also, leg-
islative assemblies participate to various degrees in the elections of the judicial council’s members.18  
 
This model, albeit being virtually uncontested in Europe, even by populist parties, does not eliminate 
all friction between the judiciary and the political branches. The main contested issue is precisely the 
appointment of judicial council members. In this regard, there are two main alternatives. The first is 
to let parliament elect the majority, or the totality, of the members of the judicial council. Yet, this 
                                                 
17 The expression is taken from: Cesare Pinelli, ‘The Populist Challenge to Constitutional Democracy’, 7 European Con-
stitutional Law Review (2011): 5–16. 
18 For a complete overview of the European model of judicial council see : German Law Journal, vol. 19, no. 7, Special 
Issue - Judicial Self-Government in Europe. 
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often results in an excessive politicisation of the judicial council and, indirectly, of the whole judici-
ary, as illustrated by the cases of Spain and Latin American Countries.19 On the other side of the 
spectrum, the Italian model provides for the judicial council’s members to be elected by judges them-
selves, with the parliament choosing a minority part of the body. This system has been authoritatively 
criticised already in 1985 by Cappelletti who held that albeit such a model ‘might still be less fearful 
than one of dependency from the political power; it is not, however, necessarily less damaging’.20 
The increased politicisation of the judicial function indeed can hardly be said to be compatible with 
a judiciary that is essentially unaccountable towards the democratically elected branches of power. 
Also, as shown by the recent scandal involving members of the Italian High Council of the Judiciary 
and MPs, the Italian model only moves the problem of politicisation from one forum to another; i.e. 
the judiciary cannot be completely insulated from political pressure.21 
 
If criticism of the European model of judicial council may in principle be justified, these are all the 
more valid for its practical implementation in Central European States. Two paradigmatic cases to 
that extent are Hungary and Poland. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these two countries swiftly 
moved towards the Western model of democracy, with the purpose of joining the European Union.22 
This included also the adoption of the European standards concerning judicial independence.23 And, 
in countries that had experienced fifty years of communist rule, characterised by an extreme deference 
                                                 
19 Aida Torres Perez, Judicial Self-Government and Judicial Independence: the Political Capture of the General Council 
of the Judiciary in Spain, 19 German Law Journal 7, 1769-1800. In 2013, the GRECO, the Council of Europe body 
entrusted with the fight against corruption, invited the Spanish government to reconsider the system of appointment of 
judges and members of the General Council of the Judiciary. See: GRECO Eval IV Rep (2013) 5E, Corruption prevention 
in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, adopted by on 6 December 2013. In October 2020 Prime 
Minister Sanchez proposed to change the Organic Law governing the system of appointment for the General Council of 
the Judiciary. The change envisages to lower the majority required for the election of 12 of 20 members of the Council 
from 3/5 of the members of the Parliament to an absolute majority as a response to the blockage of the renovation of the 
body by the opposition. Also the reform proposes that, after the expiration of the 5 years mandate, the Council is precluded 
to adopt relevant decisions until its renewal. Strong critics against such proposals were raised both by judges and oppo-
sition parties. 
20 Mauro Cappelletti, “Who Watches the Watchmen?" A Comparative Study on Judicial Responsibility, 31 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 1 (1983): 61.  
21 Interestingly, one of the proposals that were put forward to the reform the appointment process to the Consiglio Supe-
riore della Magistratura, the Italian Minister of Justice, a member of the populist 5 Star Movement, proposed to select the 
judicial members of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura by drawing. On the impact of such a move for the legiti-
macy of the body, see: Marco Mandato, Il sorteggio come metodo di decisione. Principi e fattispecie, Nomos. Le attualità 
nel diritto 3 (2019), available at: http://www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/nomos/marco-mandato-il-sorteggio-come-
metodo-di-decisione-principi-e-fattispecie/ last accessed 20 October  2020. 
22 A complete and detailed assessment of the adaptation of Central European States to the European standards concerning 
judicial independence is contained in: Open Society Institute, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independ-
ence, (Budapest, Central European University Press), 2001. 
23 Albeit the requirement to have an independent judiciary was not explicitly mentioned in the ‘Copenhagen criteria, 
during the accession talks leading to the 2004 enlargement the Commission required all candidate States - thereby 
including Hungary and Poland - to provide sufficient guarantees for judicial independence. See: D. Kochenov, ‘Behind 
the Copenhagen Facade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule 
of Law’, 8 European Integration Online Papers (2004): 20. 
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of the judiciary towards the ruling majority, this process resulted, as characterised by AG Bobek, in 
an ‘extreme swing from zero judicial independence to 200%’.24 This swing implied, amongst others, 
the institution of a judicial council. The European model of judicial council, in its version imposed 
on Central European States as a requirement under the Copenhagen criteria, used as a template the 
Italian Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura,25 and thus provides for a constitutionalisation of the 
body; a majority of the members elected by the judges; and the transferral of all substantial decision-
making powers concerning judges’ career to the body.26 
 
The Hungarian National Council of Justice, created in 1997, had responsibility for the appointment, 
promotion, dismissal, and disciplining of judges, and was elected exclusively by members of the 
judiciary, thus guaranteeing an almost complete self-administration of the judges. The granting of 
such extensive self-regulatory competences to a judiciary just came out from an authoritarian regime, 
without any serious vetting procedure may indeed represent one of the causes of the backlash against 
judicial independence in Hungary.27 
 
The Polish National Council of the Judiciary was composed of 15 judges elected by members of the 
judiciary, four by the parliament, one by the President of the Republic, with the Minister of justice 
and the President of the Supreme Court members ex officio. Similarly to Hungary, in Poland the 
establishment of judicial self-government was not preceded by any vetting procedure either.28 
 
Both these bodies were profoundly reformed by the populist governments of Hungary and Poland. 
As to the Hungarian National Council of Justice (‘NCJ’), in 2012 it was stripped of many of its powers 
by a constitutional reform that established the National Office for the Judiciary (‘NOJ’). The latter is 
a unipersonal body, composed of a President, elected with a nine year mandate by the Parliament, 
with a 2/3 majority, on a proposal from the Prime Minister. The President has the power to appoint, 
promote and discipline judges. Also, the President has been given an almost unfettered discretion to 
transfer cases from one court to another. All in all, the long duration of the mandate, combined with 
the extensive powers accorded to the President and its direct dependency from the ruling majority, 
                                                 
24 Michal Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries, 
14 European Public Law 1 (2008): 100-101. 
25 Simone Benvenuti and Davide Paris, Judicial Self-Government in Italy: Merits, Limits and the Reality of an Export 
Model, 19 German Law Journal 7 (2018): 1641 ss. 
26 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) CDL-AD (2007), Judicial Appointments, 
Report adopted by the Venice Commission at its 70th Plenary Session (March 16–17, 2007). 
27 David Kosař, Jiří Baros and Pavel Dufek, The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Techno-
cratic Governance and Populism, cit., 445. 
28 In total, only 30 disciplinary proceedings were initiated, of which four were heard by disciplinary courts. In the end, 
however, all judges were acquitted. See: Anna Śledzińska-Simon, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Government in Po-
land: On Judicial Reform Reversing Democratic Transition, 19 German Law Journal 7 (2018): 1842-1843.  
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makes it impossible to consider the President of the NOJ a self-governing body of the judges. The 
old National Council of Justice has been formally maintained, but it does not enjoy any meaningful 
power. Under the new legal framework, its main function would be to supervise the activity of the 
President of the NOJ. Yet, there is no accountability mechanism obliging the President to comply 
with the recommendations received by the Council. Interestingly, in 2019 a clash between the NCJ 
and the President resulted in the former body submitting a preliminary reference to the ECJ in which 
it is asked whether the rules of appointment of the President and its powers are compatible with EU 
standards concerning judicial independence and effective judicial protection.29 
 
 
The path followed by the Polish populist government was slightly different, as the PiS cannot count 
on a majority wide enough to proceed to a constitutional reform. Thus, instead of being reformed the 
national judicial council was packed. More specifically, on December 2017 by means of an ordinary 
law, the parliament prematurely terminated the terms of 15 judges sitting on the 25-member National 
Council for the Judiciary and changed the election rules so that 15 new members of the National 
Council for the Judiciary were elected by parliamentary majority rather than by judges. 30After this 
move, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary suspended the membership of the Polish 
concuncil for not being independent from the executive and the legislative power.31 Finally, the Min-
ister of Justice was given the power, albeit temporarily limited to 6 months, to dismiss court presidents 
and appoint new ones without consultation.  
 
One should also note that both executives approved laws lowering the mandatory retirement age for 
judges. In this case, Hungary succeeded whereas the Polish attempt was blocked by the European 
Court of Justice, which in Commission v. Poland (C-619/18) declared the lowering of the mandatory 
retirement age from 70 to 65 and the discretionary power of the President of the Republic to allow 
for a prorogation of the judges ’mandate to be incompatible with judicial independence and thus with 
                                                 
29 More extensively see: Dániel G. Szabó, A Hungarian Judge Seeks Protection from the CJEU – Part I, Verfassungsblog, 
28 July 2019, https://verfassungsblog.de/a-hungarian-judge-seeks-protection-from-the-cjeu-part-i/ last access 20 October 
2020. 
30 Notably, the withdrawal of the law was the one of the recommendations contained in the Commission reasoned opinion 
for the activation of the Article 7 TEU procedure. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/de-
tail/en/IP_17_5367 last accessed 20 October 2020.  
31 See: https://www.encj.eu/node/495 last accessed 20 October 2020. 
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the principle of effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.32 
 
 
 
The only country which resisted the pressure coming from the Commission and the Council of Europe 
to institute a judicial council was Czechia. Albeit the rule of law record of the Babiš government is 
far from being perfect, the judiciary appears to have better safeguarded its independence, especially 
if compared to Hungary and Poland. Thus, it is worth considering how judges are appointed in 
Czechia. All Czech judges are appointed by the President of the Republic, which is a counter-majori-
tarian institutional holding significant political powers, from a list prepared by the Minister of Justice 
and with the consent of the government.33 The suitable candidates are indicated by courts presidents. 
Promotion and re-assignment are carried out within the judiciary only. This means that the most po-
litically sensitive appointment, i.e. those to superior courts, including the Supreme Court, are outside 
the sphere of influence of politics. In the formulation of legal reactions to populism, in WP 7, the 
Czech model for guaranteeing judicial independence will thus deserve particular attention. 
 
In conclusion, the combined effect of the changes implemented in Hungary and Poland, is a de facto 
breach to the founding principle of constitutional democracy: the separation of powers between the 
political branches and the judiciary. The origin of these changes is to be found probably in the blind 
acceptance of the European model of judicial independence during the transition to democracy, that 
did not take into account the peculiarities of the national legal systems and societal values. Yet, the 
                                                 
32 For an extensive commentary to the case see: Piotr Bogdanowicz and Maciej Taborowski, How to Save a Supreme 
Court in a Rule of Law Crisis: the Polish Experience, 16 European Constitutional Law Review (2020): 1-22. 
33 For more details on the judicial appointment process in Czechia and the role of the President of the Republic see: Michal 
Bobek, Judicial Selection, Lay Participation, and Judicial Culture in the Czech Republic: A Study in a Central European 
(Non)Transformation, College of Europe Research Paper 3 (2014), available at: https://www.coleurope.eu/research-pa-
per/judicial-selection-lay-participation-and-judicial-culture-czech-republic-study, last accessed 20 October 2020.  
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solutions put forward by populist constitutionalism as implemented by populist governments under-
mine the very foundation of the rule of law state and represent an overreaction to an inherent tension 
in constitutional democracy between the majoritarian institutions and the counter-majoritarian ones. 
 
1.2.2 Populism and constitutional courts  
 
Moving to the second aspect, i.e. judicial activism in constitutional adjudication, the cause-effect 
relationship follows the same pattern. Alike an independent judiciary, a constitutional court empow-
ered to carry out judicial review of legislation is considered to be part of the European version of 
constitutional democracy.34 The possibility of declaring a piece of legislation null and void for being 
in violation of the constitution, embeds the very idea that the will of the ruling majority is subject to 
constraints: constitutional courts indeed can be rightfully considered the counter-majoritarian institu-
tions par excellence. After WWII constitutional courts took a proactive stance, abandoning the role 
of mere negative legislators assigned to them under the Kelsenian model, and beginning an extensive 
production of judge-made law. The 20th century, in fact, has also been dubbed by constitutional law 
scholars as the century of constitutional justice.35  
 
Whilst the role of constitutional courts is essentially undisputed by populist parties in Western Europe 
- with the possibile exception of Catalan independentists - in CEE States constitutional judges have 
been frequently the target of attacks by populist governments. During the transition to democracy of 
post-communist countries, a body entitled to perform judicial review of legislation was made a re-
quirement under the ‘Copenhagen criteria’. In general, all the constitutional jurisdictions of CEE 
States showed a somehow surprising readiness to overturn important statutes, often frustrating genu-
ine attempts of reforms by incumbent governments.36 Among these courts the most active was the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court. During the 1990s, it presented itself as the guardian of the demo-
cratic transition. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, in fact, was an example of judicial activism 
especially with respect to the economic and social policies of government by limiting what the gov-
ernment could do at its own discretion. Also, the Hungarian Constitutional Court availed itself of its 
                                                 
34 See: Venice Commission,. CDL-STD(1993)002-e, Models of constitutional jurisdiction - Science and technique of 
democracy, no. 2 (1993), 3.  
35 See: David Rousseau, La justice constitutionnelle en Europe, (Montchrestien 1992). 
36 See: Hermann Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (The University of Chicago 
Press 2000).  
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powers to introduce into the country European standards concerning the rule of law state and funda-
mental rights. In the end, the most powerful constitutional jurisdiction in CEE was the target of the 
most ferocious attack on its prerogatives and independence.  
 
In comparison to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal had, at least 
in its first years, a more deferent attitude towards the government. Nonetheless, in the context of a 
multi-party system where political deadlocks were common, the Polish Constitutional tribunal grad-
ually affirmed itself as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution. Notwithstanding a high rate of 
judgment of unconstitutionality, the Constitutional Court and the Parliament in Poland managed to 
build strong mutual relations with only occasional conflicts.37 On the contrary, the period after the 
election of the first PiS government, in 2005, was marked by frequent and much more serious con-
flicts between the government and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. These clashes were only the 
prelude to what happened in 2015 when the PiS came to power again.  
 
By packing the constitutional courts with government-friendly judges and hollowing them out of their 
powers - e.g. the New Fundamental of Hungary substantially reduces the scope of judicial review of 
legislation especially as regards abstract control - the populist governments conveyed the message 
that the will of the ruling majority, being legitimated by the popular vote, cannot be made subject to 
unelected bodies.  
 
A justification for such a claim is ready made. Many states, including within the EU, e.g. the Nether-
lands, indeed do not allow any judge to scrutiny the constitutionality of legislative acts. However, 
one should note that any comparison between consolidated democracies and new one should be given 
careful consideration, in particular one should look at the national legal system as a whole and its 
history. Also, if a constitutional jurisdiction is provided for in the constitution, as it is still case in 
both Hungary and Poland, it should be put in the conditions to carry out its mandate. And, this is not 
case in these two countries, where the constitutional courts have been captured by the ruling majority 
and they have been transformed into sham constitutional courts.  
 
Concerning Hungary specifically, the main instrument to shield laws enacted by the majority from 
judicial review, has been to enact these laws at a constitutional level, thus radically foreclosing the 
jurisdiction of the court. And this often resulted in a violation of the rights of minorities and margin-
alised groups, as illustrated by the constitutionalisation, after two rulings from the Constitutional 
                                                 
37 David Kosař, Jiří Baros and Pavel Dufek, The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Techno-
cratic Governance and Populism, cit.., 445. 
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Court of opposite sign, of the possibility for local governments to prohibit homelessness and a classic 
definition of marriage, as including only heterosexual couples. 
 
What happened in Poland, during the ‘battle for the Constitutional Tribunal’,38 also clearly demon-
strates that these attacks on constitutional courts are not based on a dissatisfaction with the overall 
performance of the Court, but rather strikes at the very existence of limits to the popular will. The 
illegal appointment of three constitutional judges, albeit preceded by a dubious attempt of the previ-
ous ruling party, the Civic Platform, to appoint five candidate judges in the last days of the legislature, 
the removal of the Court’s president and the subsequent packing of the Constitutional Tribunal 
demonstrate that behind the PiS attack there is only the intention to loosen the constraints on the 
government’s actions, rather than an intention to coherently reshape the functions and competences 
of the constitutional adjudicator.39  
The constitutional courts of Slovakia and Czechia, instead, appear to have better resisted the populist 
tide. Significantly, both courts embraced the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amend-
ments:40 the Czech court in 2009, and the Slovak one in 2016.41  
This doctrine represents the ultimate consequence of judicial activism, as it essentially empowers 
constitutional courts to strike down constitutional amendments and legislation for incompatibility 
with the higher principles of the constitution, sometimes identified by the judges themselves.42 How-
ever, this ‘extreme’ form of judicial activism, did not cost the two courts their independence. In the 
Slovak case, on the contrary, this judicial doctrine was endorsed in the aftermath of a constitutional 
crisis, during which the President of the Republic refused to appoint three new judges to the Consti-
tutional court, notwithstanding a ruling from the Constitutional Court that this constituted a violation 
                                                 
38 Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and 
Constitutional Self-Defense, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Dec. 6, 2015, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-con-
stitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-constitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional-self-defense, last accessed 20 
October 2020. 
39 A more detailed account of these event may be found in the Venice Commission opinion on the law on the Constitu-
tional Tribunal. See: CDL-AD(2016)001, Opinion on amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tri-
bunal of Poland, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016). 
40 For a detailed illustration of this theory see: Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2018). 
41 Judgment of Slovak Constitutional Court of 30 January 2019. For a commentary on the judgment see: Simon Drugda, 
Slovak Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Constitutional Amendment—But the Amendment Remains Valid, Blog of 
the International Journal of Constitutional Law, 25 April 2019, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/04/slo-
vak-constitutional-court-strikes-down-a-constitutional-amendment-but-the-amendment-remains-valid/ last accessed 20 
October 2020. 
42 In legal systems where the constitution contains an eternity clause, as is case for Germany, the application of this 
doctrine is obviously less controversial.  
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of the Slovak Constitution.43 After the ‘surrender’ of the President of the Republic, who finally ap-
pointed the three judges, and the election of the a new liberal pro-European president, Zuzana 
Čaputová, the Constitutional court may ride this anti-populist tide to reaffirm its role as the supreme 
interpreter of the Constitution and guarantor of fundamental liberties.  
 
At the opposite side of the spectrum there is Hunagry, where the populist majority has tried to limit 
as much as possibile the judicial activism of the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Fundamental 
Law of 2011 indeed prescribed the methods of interpretation of its own text. According to this unusual 
but not unprecedented approach, the Constitution requires the Constitutional Court to apply specific 
methods when it interpreting the provisions of the Fundamental Law. While some of these ways are 
well-known and appear in most constitutional courts’ practices, like the purposive interpretation or 
the plain meaning rule, others relate to certain content requirements in order to enforce specific 
constitutional values, such as respect for the historical constitution or the principle of balanced, 
transparent and sustainable budget management. Besides,, the Fourth Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law of March 2013 repealed all Constitutional Court rulings prior to the entry into force 
of the new Fundamental Law in 2012. Thus further pushing the Constitutional Court to a change of 
its case law, more in line with the values bring forward by the new populist majority. The combined 
effect of the imposed methods of constitutional interpretation and court-packing resulted 
unsurprisingly in constitutional jurisprudence more favourable to the populist majority, and makes it 
harder to consider the current constitutional court as an effective counter-majoritarian institution.44  
 
1.2.3 Populism and technocratic governance  
 
Like the judiciary and constitutional courts, all the bodies which embody technocratic governance, 
can be classified as non-majoritarian ones. Yet, if the former respond to the necessity of ensuring that 
the political branches act in respect of laws and constitution, the creation of independent authorities 
                                                 
43 A complete illustration of this constitutional crisis can be found in the I-Connect Symposium on the case. The first 
episode of the saga is available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/01/symposium-slovak-appointments-case-intro-
duction/, last accessed 20 October 2020.  
44 More extensively see: Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz and Zoltán Szente. Framing constitutional interpretation in the populist 
age, paper presented at the XIVth CEENJ conference, Jurisprudence in Central and Eastern Europe, which took place 
in Bratislava, Slovakia, on September 12-13 2020.  
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is adopted on another rationale. Namely, the idea that, giving the growing complexities of contempo-
rary societies, the government’s functions are better exercised by the people with expertise in the 
field to be regulated.45  
 
Critics of technocratic governance point out that this delegation actually is due to the unwillingness 
of political parties to take decisions with long term effects, as these may affect negatively their elec-
toral performance, on which their permanence in power relies. Many authors have also emphasised 
how, in the last decades, the growth — both in number and competences — of independent authorities 
and regulatory agencies, has been uncontrolled, causing an excessive depoliticisation of the public 
sphere and a marginalisation of the parliament’s role.46 Hence, they observe that, in this regard, pop-
ulism and technocratic governance are related phenomena as they both produce an imbalance in the 
separation of powers.47 In this light, a clash between technocratic institutions and populism appears 
unavoidable. 
 
Within the European Union Member States, the diffusion of independent authorities amongst Mem-
ber States varies considerably. For instance, France, following the ‘EU model’, created a vast array 
of technocratic authorities with a considerable degree of independence. At the opposite, in Germany, 
confidence in the capacity of the legislature and the executive to pursue rational policy remains 
strong, as a consequence there are only a few independent administrative agencies.48 Nonetheless, the 
EU has always pushed for a significant depoliticisation of the public sphere, to be realised by confer-
ring significant powers to bodies composed of experts.49 Evidently, during the accession phase of 
CEE States the EU leverage power was bigger. All CEE States did indeed adopt a vast array of reg-
ulatory agencies and independent oversight authorities. 
 
The dismantlement of technocratic governance can be considered as ‘step two ’of democratic erosion, 
which is why such a process has been systemic only in Hungary, where Fidesz’s spell on power 
started in 2010. In a nutshell, Orbán packed all the independent entities within the executive branch, 
                                                 
45 Davide Majone, Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: the Question of Standards, 4 European Law Journal 1 (1998): 5-28. 
46 See: Cesare Pinelli, ‘The Populist Challenge to Constitutional Democracy’, 7 European Constitutional Law Review 
(2011): 15. 
47 Cristopher Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, ‘Populism and Technocracy’, in C. Rovira et al. (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press 2017. The challenge to the separation of powers posed by technocratic 
governance has been also signalled by Bruce Ackerman. See: ’The New Separation of Powers’ 113 Harvard Law Review 
(2000): 633. 
48 Susan Rose‐Ackerman, The Regulatory State, in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, (Oxford University Press, 2012), 676.  
49 Stéphanie De Somer, Autonomous Public Bodies and the Law: A European Perspective, (Edward Elgar 2017), in par-
ticular, 23-100. 
17
including the Electoral Commission, the Budget Commission, the Media Board, and the Ombudsman 
office, in most of the cases simply by removing incumbent members.50 The negative effects of such 
a move are particularly visible in the case of the Electoral Commission, whose function is to ensure 
the fairness of all electoral consultations. The Orbán government proceeded to modify the composi-
tion and powers of the body only in 2013, contextually all the incumbent members were also re-
moved.51 The most worrying element is the distinction between members elected by the parliament 
with a 2/3 majority, whose mandate has a duration of nine years, and members delegated by the 
opposition parties, who took office just after the inauguration of the Parliament and whose mandate 
ends with the legislature, i.e. they are not sitting in the Electoral Commission during the parliamentary 
elections.  
 
Poland can also provide a useful example in this regard. In 2015, the PiS enacted a new media law 
that required all broadcasters to have a board controlled by the government. The new law dismissed 
the boards of all public-service broadcasters and gave each broadcaster a new board, whose members 
can be appointed and dismissed at any time by the Ministry of the Treasury. Such a dependency, in a 
context in which the National Media Council — the oversight authorities for media in Poland — is 
already controlled by the government, cannot but threaten the freedom of information in the country, 
especially for political opponents.52 
 
All in all, the Polish and Hungarian cases illustrate that the attacks on technocratic governance are 
not motivated by a desire to redress an existing imbalance in constitutional democracies. Rather, they 
aim at dismantling the checks on the ruling majority’s actions with the objective of tightening its grip 
on power.  
 
1.3 Populist constitutionalism and the role of parliaments  
 
In legal scholarship, there is a general consensus about the fact that populism is strong in places with 
weak party systems.53 In other words, when the smooth functioning of parliaments has been hindered 
by an extreme fragmentation of political parties in the representative assembly, this constitutes the 
ideal breeding ground for populist phenomena to rise. The reaction of populist constitutionalism to 
                                                 
50 For more details on the attack on the Hungarian independent authorities see: Valentina Carlino, Ungheria: le autorità 
indipendenti e la ‘democratic erosion’, Nomos. Le attualità nel diritto, 3 (2019). 
51 Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
52 More in details on the attack on freedom of expression by the Polish Government see: Joanna Fomina and Jacek Ku-
charczyk The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in Poland, 27 Journal of Democracy 4 (2016): 58-68. 
53 Jan Werner Müller, What is Populism?, (Penguins Book, 2016). 
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this fragmentation, which often leads to political deadlocks in parliamentary systems, is to strip Par-
liament of any effective powers in favour of the executive, more specifically in the figure of the Prime 
Minister. 
The events in Czech Republic are paradigmatic to that regard. First, in 2013, Czech Republic’s first 
directly elected president, Miloš Zeman, sought to transform the country’s parliamentary system into 
a semi-presidential one. Zeman, used the legitimacy deriving from its direct election and proceeded 
to directly appoint his own government, completely bypassing the Czech parliament. This arrogation 
of the key power of government formation, that under the Czech Constitution belongs to the parlia-
ment, was made without any formal amendment to the Constitution, yet the separation of powers was 
significantly altered as the Parliament was deprived of its most significant check on the executive. 
Subsequently, in 2017, the winner of the parliamentary elections and current Prime Minister, Andrej 
Babiš, pledged to abolish the upper chamber of the Parliament (Senate) and to reduce the number of 
MPs in the lower chamber from 200 to 101. In other words, Babiš aims for a centralisation of power 
by strengthening the majoritarian elements of Czech parliamentarism. Yet, unlike Orbán, Babiš does 
not have the required majority to push these constitutional amendments through the Parliament. 
 
Also in Hungary, the powers of the National Assembly have been significantly curtailed by Fidesz’s 
reforms.54 The newly created Budget Council, ‘an organ supporting Parliament’s legislative activities 
and examining feasibility of the State Budget’, does indeed have a veto right on approval of the annual 
budget law passed by the parliament. Although the Council may refuse to give consent only in spec-
ified cases (e.g. if the budget bill would allow state debt to exceed half of the GDP), its decision may 
not be reviewed or annulled, and this constitutes an exceptional restriction of the Parliament’s budg-
etary power. Further, in case the Budget Council denies its consent to the budget, the President of the 
Republic may dissolve the parliament. Evidently, in a parliamentary system, as Hungary formally 
still is, this constitutes a complete reversal of the normal functioning of the relationship between the 
executive and the legislative powers.  
 
A similar attitude towards the parliament’s role has been manifested by the Italian 5-Star Movement, 
in power since 2018. First, the 5 Star Movement supported by the Northern League, proposed to 
introduce a more stringent control over representatives by abolishing the prohibition of imperative 
                                                 
54 More in details on the reforms implemented by the Orban’s government concerning the role of parliament see: Zoltán 
Szente, How Populism Destroys Political Representation(Anti-)Parliamentary Reforms in Hungary after 2010, DPCE 
Online 2 (2019): 1609-1618. 
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mandate. However, while a proposal for amending Article 67 of the Italian Constitution, which con-
tains the prohibition of imperative mandate, has not been presented yet, the 5 Star Movement adopted 
an internal rule against the phenomenon of ‘floor crossing’, which provides for the imposition of a 
pecuniary sanction of 100 000.00 euros on any MP leaving the party. Leaving aside the question of 
the constitutionality of such a rule, which is at least doubtful,55 one should ponder carefully the effect 
of the introduction of an imperative mandate in parliamentary systems. Indeed, this can only result in 
an increase in the role of political parties, in the person of their leaders, which would have the power 
to expel members, causing the automatic termination of the MP’s mandate. The prohibition of imper-
ative mandate in fact constitutes the main guarantee for individual MPs against political parties ’
abuse, and its abolition would only lead to a stronger ‘partitocracy’.  
 
Also, the 5 Star Movement pushed though the parliament a constitutional reform which reduces the 
members of both chambers by approximately one third (the Chamber of Deputies from 630 members 
to 400 and the Senate from 315 to 200 members).56 After its approval in a referendum celebrated on 
the 20-21 September 2020, the reform entered into force, albeit it only will produce its effects from 
the next legislature. So far, this represents the sole institutional reform enacted by the 5 Star Move-
ment which has been approved by the parliament, thanks to the votes of the Democratic Party.  
A similar proposal is the one contained in the political programme of Marine Le Pen Rassemblement 
National, which aims at reducing the number of members of both the lower and upper houses of the 
French parliament. This proposal is accompanied by another which aims at introducing a majority 
bonus to the party that obtains at least the 30% of the popular vote in a newly designed proportional 
electoral system. Once again, the combined effect of these proposals would be the injection of a 
further majoritarian element in the French constitutional democracy, to the detriment of parliamen-
tarian component.  
 
Finally, these direct attacks on the parliaments have to be considered also in light of that illustrated 
in working paper On the Institutional Context of Populism regarding the use made by populist parties 
of the direct and participative democracy instruments.57 Indeed, the attitude of populist parties as 
regards the role of parliament in constitutional democracy is only apparently contradictory. The real 
goal of the populist constitutionalism is not to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the constitutional 
                                                 
55 See: Cesare Pinelli, Il M5S e il rifiuto della rappresentanza politica, Rivista Il Mulino, 02 February 2018, available at: 
https://www.rivistailmulino.it/news/newsitem/index/Item/News:NEWS_ITEM:4239 last accessed  20 October 2020.  
56 The reform also limits to 5 the number of the senators appointed by the President of the Republic that can be sitting in 
the parliament, whilst under the previous system each President had the right to appoint 5.  
57  See working paper On the Institutional Context of Populism: https://openarchive.tk.mta.hu/423/ last accessed 20 
October 2020. 
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system but rather to empower the ruling majority to act without constraints. To do so, populists push 
for a centralisation of powers in the hands of the executive, frequently controlled by a charismatic 
leader. This produces as a consequence a marginalisation of parliaments, which manifests itself in 
various forms, spacing the abolition of the upper house, the reduction of the number of MPs, to the 
most extreme one, the introduction of checks above its core competences, like the approval of budg-
etary bills. 
 
1.4 Populist constitutionalism and the people  
 
To fully evaluate the impact of populist constitutionalism on constitutional democracy, it is also nec-
essary to assess the consequence of the claim made by populist parties to embody the popular will. 
 
Significative in this regard, is the case of the Catalan secessionist process, at least since 2015 until 
2017. The separatist parties, who held a thin majority in the regional parliament elected in 2014, 
approved Resolution 1/XI which proclaimed the start of a constituent process and expressly declared 
the will to ignore the decisions of the Spanish State institutions, and in particular the Constitutional 
Tribunal, which is declared deprived ‘of competence and legitimacy’.58 This resolution represents a 
turning point in the secessionist process, inasmuch as from this moment on, the Catalan government 
acted in open the defiance of the laws and Constitution of Spain with the sole goal of achieving 
independence. An illegal referendum took place on 1 October 2017. The law declaring the referendum 
was approved by the Catalan parliament on 6 September 2017 along with the Law on legal transition 
and foundation of the Republic of Catalonia, containing a ‘provisional constitution ’of the Catalan 
Republic, which was approved the next day. Both bills were approved with disregard of the rules 
disciplining the legislative process, in particular regarding the opposition’s rights. More importantly, 
Article 3 of both laws self-attributed to the two statutes supremacy over all conflicting norms, thereby 
including the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. Further, the referendum law 
stated that if the votes in favour of independence would be the majority, the result of the referendum 
would be binding with a simple majority, without requiring any participation or approval quorum. 
The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal declared the referendum unconstitutional on 17 October,59 and 
the Law on legal transition null and void the following 8 November.60 In the latter judgment, the 
                                                 
58 The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal declared the unconstitutionality of this resolution in its judgment 259/2015 firmly 
defending constitutional democracy vis-á-vis the attempt to initiate a secessionist process outside a consensual framework. 
More extensively see: Josep Maria Castellà, Tribunal Constitucional y proceso secesionista catalán: respuestas jurídico-
constitucionales a un conflicto político-constitucional, 37 Teoria y Realidad Constitucional (2016): 561-592.  
59 Judgment 114/2017, of 17 October 2017. 
60 Judgment 124/2017, of 8 November 2017.  
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Constitutional Tribunal stressed that the law was unconstitutional also according to the Statute of 
Autonomy of Catalonia which requires a two third majority in the Catalan parliament for any change 
to Catalonia’s Statute.  
 
What the Catalan secessionist process illustrates is that the pretence of populist parties to embody the 
popular will generates a clash with the limits inherent in constitutional democracy, in particular the 
rights of political minorities. Besides, this overemphasis on popular legitimacy, leads populist parties, 
even at subnational level, to disregard the checks and limits imposed by counter-majoritarian institu-
tions, in particular by the constitutional court. 
Besides, what the Catalan crisis confirms is how referenda, especially if not provided for by the con-
stitutional framework and thus illegal, are a dangerous instrument that can led to a polarisation in the 
civil society.61 
In homogeneous societies, such as those of CEE states, the exclusivist reference of populist parties 
to their people, instead results more often in a lower protection of the rights of minorities and mar-
ginalised groups. The examples that can be offered in this regard are numerous: from the constitu-
tionalisation of the prohibition of homelessness in Hungary, to the challenge by Hungary and Slo-
vakia of the Council Decision on the relocation of refugees among Member States, and the restrictive 
stance of all CEE states towards same-sex marriage. 
 
All in all, populist constitutionalism seems to be radically incompatible with the pluralistic nature of 
contemporary constitutional democracy. Moreover, the claim ‘we are the people ’often overlooks the 
real composition of the civil society. In Catalonia, for instance, the separatist parties only have a thin 
majority, if any, in the Parliament, not in the electorate. Similarly, the government sponsored refer-
endum held in Hungary on the mandatory relocation of refugees,62 and the referendum on the ban of 
                                                 
61 Working paper On the Institutional Context of Populism, 15-16 available at: https://openarchive.tk.mta.hu/423/ last 
accessed 20 October 2020. 
62 Ibidem, 8. 
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same-sex marriage in Romania and Slovakia,63 saw the participation of a minority part of the elec-
torate — in the latter cases the turnout was around 20% — thus demonstrating that the populist agenda 
is not always in line with the people’s will. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, at least to a certain degree, the actions of populist governments in CEE Member States 
can be considered an ‘overreaction to an overreaction’.64  
The imposition from above of predetermined standards concerning judicial independence, the role of 
constitutional courts, and technocratic governance may indeed not have been the most effective strat-
egy for a successful transition to democracy in the long run. Yet, as the Slovak constitutional crisis 
demonstrates, the institutional context only has a relative importance in the contrast of populism, 
other factors such as the civic engagement and personal qualities of public officials play a decisive 
role. As Karl Popper once wrote ‘[i]nstitutions are like [a] fortress. They must be well designed and 
manned’, and ‘the functioning of even the best institutions will always depend to a considerable de-
gree, on the persons involved’.65 
 
In this light, the reforms enacted by populist governments, especially in Hungary and Poland, rather 
than an ‘overreaction’ should be qualified as an attempt to affirm that the popular will, embodied by 
the ruling majority, is the sole legitimate authority to be obeyed. Such a claim cannot but result in a 
State which is not governed by the rule of law: ultimately populist constitutionalism ends up eroding 
constitutional democracy as a whole rather than re-equilibrating it.66 With regard to the preliminary 
findings of the research carried out within this subtask, two main points need to be emphasised.  
 
1) Any justification for the claims of populist constitutionalism seems to be untenable. Whilst it can 
be said that populist constitutionalism seeks to redress existing imbalances and flaws inherent in con-
stitutional democracy, populist parties provide the wrong solutions to these problems. More worry-
ingly, populist parties, once in power, appear to act in bad faith, disregarding the limits imposed by 
the Constitution, with the only aim to ensure their permanence in power. And, this constitutes a direct 
                                                 
63 On these referenda see: Elżbieta Kużelewska, Same-Sex Marriage -A Happy End Story? The Effectiveness of Refer-
endum on Same-Sex Marriage in Europe, 24 Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 1 (2019), available at: https://www.re-
searchgate.net/publication/333984515, last accessed  20 October 2020. 
64 David Kosař, Jiří Baros and Pavel Dufek, The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Techno-
cratic Governance and Populism, cit.., 430. 
65 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (Routledge, 2011 (1st version 1945)), 120.  
66 Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, How to save a constitutional democracy, (Chicago University Press, 2018), 68 ss. 
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threat to the pluralistic dimension of contemporary constitutional democracy both in the institutions 
and in society.  
 
2) As a consequence of the point above, we are forced to agree with David Landau that the agenda to 
immunise constitutional democracy vis-á-vis the populist challenge, is an almost impossible one.67 
Yet, this should not lead to the conclusion that checks and balances of constitutional democracy are 
irrelevant. Drawing from the research conducted in WP 2 and 6 it is possible to affirm that the in-
volvement of a plurality of institutional actors in the procedure of constitutional revision, in conjunc-
tion with qualified majorities ensuring a substantial consensus to its approval, as well as in the ap-
pointment process of constitutional and ordinary judges appears to be a successful strategy to limit 
the most detrimental effects of a prolonged populist rule. In other words, the answer to the populist 
oversimplifications may well be more complexity in the design of democratic institutions.  
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2. Populism and the EU  
 
2.1 The Rule of Law and EU’s values  
 
The Rule of Law is one of the fundamental values of the Union, enshrined in Article 2 (TEU). It is a 
prerequisite for the protection of all the other fundamental values of the EU, especially fundamental 
rights and democracy.68 Most notably the respect of these values is a precondition for the effective 
application of EU law, the proper functioning of the internal market and for mutual trust among 
member states.69 The core of the rule of law is effective judicial protection, which requires the inde-
pendence, quality and efficiency of national justice systems, as reflected in Article 19 TEU, which 
gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU.70 Article 2 aims 
at protecting the constitutional fundamentals of the European legal foundations. The values enshrined 
in Article 2 TEU apply to any Member State action through mutual amplification with a specific 
provision of EU law but does ‘not aim at the existence of uniform principles and rules, but solely at 
the observing of European minimum standards’.71 This approach is based on the idea, embedded in 
Article 4(2) TEU, that the EU shall respect the constitutional diversities existing between its Member 
States.72 Evidently, this affects the extent of the Article 7 procedure, as the EU cannot demand uni-
form standards from Member States, as such an interpretation cannot be squared with either Articles 
4(2) and 5(1) TEU or Article 51(1) CFR. Therefore, the question is not if there are limits to constitu-
tional pluralism, but how the limits should be defined when certain Member States are weakening the 
Rule of Law values.73 
The tools available to EU institutions to ensure compliance with the Rule of Law values vary signif-
icantly in their scope and reach. There are three ‘soft law’ mechanisms that can be seen as a prepar-
atory step towards legal action, which include the transitional ‘special cooperation and verification 
mechanism’ (included in the Act of Accession for Bulgaria and Romania), the Commission’s rule of 
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law framework, and the Council’s annual dialogues on the rule of law. Adding to the ‘soft law’ mech-
anisms, the following legal procedures are also available to ensure the protection of the rule of law in 
the EU:  
 The breach of values procedure following TEU Article 7 TEU can be triggered, possibly lead-
ing to the suspension of a Member State’s membership rights.74 
 Infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU can be brought by the Commission if the 
alleged breach could amount to the violation of a specific rule of EU law.  
 National courts from a Member State in which the rule of law is breached may refer prelimi-
nary questions pursuant Article 267 TFEU, seeking guidance on the interpretation of EU law 
and the values in Article 2 TEU with a view to assess the compatibility of national legislation.  
 
2.2 The New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law (2014) 
 
The Commission presented its New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law in 2014 as a tool 
to ensure ‘an effective and coherent protection of the rule of law in all Member States.’75 The 2014 
Rule of Law Framework comprises a structured dialogue between the Commission and Member 
States disrespecting the rule of law, and the Council’s Annual Dialogues on the Rule of Law (2014),76 
allowing national governments to discuss rule of law related issues within the Council have been 
amended in 2019. 
The 2014 framework has been heavily criticised for being not legally binding and not providing any 
sanctions’ mechanism. Furthermore, non-compliance does not automatically lead to activation of Ar-
ticle 7 TEU. Thus, this discursive approach is unlikely to have any substantial effect on defiant Mem-
ber States.77 In Poland, for instance, the long dialogues allowed for even more dismantling of the rule 
of law before Article 7 (1) TEU was ultimately activated. The Venice Commission published several 
opinions on Poland in the same period.78 The Commission’s 2014 Rule of Law Framework has only 
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75  COM (2014) 158, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the rule of law, 3. 
76  Council Document 16862/14, 12 December 2014. 
77 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, “Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of Law Frame-
work and its Activation, 54 Journal of Common Market Studies  5  (2016), 1066-1067. 
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been applied to Poland, whereas Article 7(1) TEU has been triggered both in relation to Poland and 
Hungary.79 
The latest development in the Rule of Law framework is the Communication of 17 July 2019 in which 
the Commission sets out concrete actions to strengthen the Union’s capacity to promote and uphold 
the rule of law, through promotion of a common rule of law culture, prevention of rule of law prob-
lems and an effective response. In particular, the Commission has established a Rule of Law Review 
Cycle and called on the EU institutions for a coordinated approach.80  
Many authors rate these mechanisms as largely ineffective.81 In particular, they suggest that there is 
no point dialoguing with would-be autocrats all too happy to establish autocratic regimes while pock-
eting EU funds. This is why the Commission should not bother with activating the pre-Article 7 
procedure and rather prioritise the prompt initiation of an infringement action based on Article 258 
TFEU — coupled with Article 19(1) TFEU regarding aspects relating to judicial independence as 
well as an application for interim measures to provisionally prevent the application of relevant na-
tional provisions. 
2.3 Article 7 TEU mechanism: ‘serious and persistent breach’ of EU values 
 
The specific purpose of Article 7(1) TEU is to prevent Member State’s breaches of the Rule of Law. 
It allows for action before a Member State has breached the values. The mechanism is triggered by a 
reasoned proposal from either 1/3 of Member States, the European Parliament (EP) or the Commis-
sion, following which the Council by a majority of 4/5, and after having obtained the EP’s consent, 
may determine the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach of EU values by a Member State. The 
preventive mechanism is independent from the sanctions mechanism provided in the subsequent par-
agraphs of Article 7 TEU. In the first step the European Council determines by unanimity the exist-
ence of a serious and persistent breach of EU values by a Member State — and in a second step the 
Council can decide by qualified majority to suspend ‘certain of the rights deriving from the applica-
tion of the Treaties to the Member State in question.’ The Council may subsequently decide to vary 
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or revoke such measures if the situation in the Member State changes, again acting by qualified ma-
jority. 
This is a mechanism dominated by political actors, assigning a major role to the Council.82 Article 7 
TEU ‘is not confined to areas covered by EU law but empowers the EU to intervene with the purpose 
of protecting the rule of law also in areas where Member States act autonomously.’83 The requirement 
for unanimity in Article 7(2) makes it very difficult to activate the sanctions mechanism, and so far 
only Art. 7(1) has been triggered: against Poland in 201784 and Hungary in 2018.85  Due to the 
unanimity requirements in the second stage of the preocedure, expectations are low as to its effi-
ciency. 
 
2.4 The judicial response. The infringement proceeding against Hungary and Poland 
The Commission in its 2014 Rule of Law Framework envisaged Article 7 as taking over when the 
infringement mechanism is inadequate to tackle systematic breaches, and the Council and the ECJ 
seem to endorse a view of the two mechanisms as coexisting in the field of the Rule of Law.86 In this 
light, the infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU can be seen to complement Article 7 TEU. 
2.4.1. Infringement procedures. The human rights approach  
 
The first infringement procedure following Article 258 TFEU about rule of law was launched in 2012 
against Hungary. The CJEU found that Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations by adopting a 
national scheme requiring compulsory retirement of judges, prosecutors and notaries when they reach 
the age of 62 — which gives rise to a difference in treatment on grounds of age which is not propor-
tionate as regards the objectives pursued.87  
The legal basis used by the CJEU was Articles 2 and 6(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. 
By relying on the provisions of Directive 2000/78 and the principle of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of age,88 the Commission did not eliminate the threat to the independence of the judiciary as 
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the judges could be compensated instead of reinstated to their former positions.89 This approach by 
the EU Commission in securing compliance with EU values can therefore be labelled as the ‘human 
rights approach’.  
In the second case against Hungary the Commission used another strategy by invoking the EU Charter 
as grounds of infringement.90 The ECJ found that by adopting the national provision and thereby ex 
lege cancelling the rights of usufruct over agricultural land located in Hungary that are held, directly 
or indirectly, by nationals of other Member States, Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 63 TFEU in conjunction with Article 17 of the Charter. 
This case exemplifies how the Commission is and was determined to use the Charter as a legal in-
strument in the Commission’s infringement policy and the rule of law crisis.91 However, the ECJ did 
not address the concerns about the arbitrary exercise of power and the rule of law directly. The human 
rights approach was therefore not sufficient to combat the fundamental weakening of the rule of Law.  
2.4.2. The second phase. A strategy focused on judicial independence  
 
In the next phase of case law from the CJEU the EU Commission decided to directly tackle the prob-
lem of independence of the national judiciaries. This was made possible by the somewhat unexpected 
turn in the ECJ’s case law with the judgment in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses 
(‘ASJP’).92 The case did not directly concern the Rule of Law crisis, instead the ECJ was called upon 
to clarify whether the austerity measures adopted during the financial crisis by Portuguese govern 
had a negative effect on judicial independence.93  
The judgment affirms that the principle of the effective judicial protection, referred to in the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, and the existence of effective judicial review designed to 
ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law. The ECJ thereby held that it was 
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possible to find a national provision incompatible with EU law on the ground that it violated Article 
19 TEU. Thereby combining the human rights approach with a value-based approach. 
The next important case in order to appreciate the development of the jurisprudence of the CJEU is 
the judgment of 25 July 2018 in Minister for Justice and Equality C-216/18 PPU, also known as the 
LM case94. In this case the High Court of Ireland asked the ECJ about the conditions to refuse to 
execute European Arrest Warrants. The referring court did indeed consider that the ‘wide and un-
checked powers’ of the Minister of justice in Poland were inconsistent with those granted in a dem-
ocratic State subject to the rule of law, and that there was a real risk of the person concerned being 
subjected to arbitrariness in the course of his trial in the issuing Member State.95  
The ECJ emphasised that the reasoned proposal of the Commission to activate Article 7(1) TEU could 
be used as an indicator that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial guar-
anteed by Article 47(2) of the Charter. Consequently, the ECJ allowed the Irish court to determine, 
specifically and precisely, whether there were substantial grounds for believing that that person will 
run such a risk if he is surrendered to that State. The relevance of this judgment for the rule of law 
protection is debatable, inasmuch as the ECJ reaffirmed that application of the principle of mutual 
trust can be suspended only in extremely exceptional cases. 
 
The ASJP case also constituted the legal basis for the two infringement proceedings against Poland. 
In the first case, the Commission impugned the Polish law which lowered the retirement age for 
Supreme Court judges and that applied to judges in post who were appointed to that court before 
3 April 2018. The same law also granted the President of the Republic the discretion to extend the 
period of judicial activity of retiring judges beyond the newly fixed retirement age.96 The judgment, 
rejecting the argument brought forward by the Polish government, specifies that the Commission can 
bring infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU even where Article 7(1) TEU has been ini-
tiated97. Further, the ECJ made clear that the Commission could rely on Article 19 TEU separately in 
infringement proceedings while further substantiating the interpretation of Article 19 TEU through 
Article 47 of the Charter.98 Consequently, the ECJ concluded that the Polish government had failed 
to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, given that the impugned 
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law was inconsistent with the principles of the irremovability and independence of judges which are 
protected under EU law.  
 
The same approach was used in the second infringement proceeding against Poland about the alleged 
discrimination on grounds of sex due to the different retirement age of ordinary court judges, Supreme 
Court judges and prosecutors for women and men and granting the Minister for Justice the power to 
extend the active mandate of ordinary court judges.99 The legal basis was Article 157 TFEU and Ar-
ticles 5(a) and 9(1)(f) of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation, but also Article 19(1) TEU. Yet another in-
fringement action has been brought on 25 October 2019, in which the Commission alleges the viola-
tion of Article 19(1) TEU caused by the Minister of Justice’s possibility of disciplining judges for the 
content of their decisions. 
In parallel to the Commission’s actions, Polish judges are submitting preliminary questions to the 
ECJ about the threats to the independence of the Polish judiciary.100 Romanian national courts have 
recently followed the example of the Polish courts with a series of requests for preliminary reference 
rulings concerning threats to the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in Romania.101 In 
contrast, Hungarian judges have always been more deferential towards their government, and thus 
making it harder for the ECJ to protect the rule of law in that country.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
In light of the aforesaid, there are two main provisional conclusions that can be drawn: 
1) Given the quasi-federal nature of the EU, Member States retain a significant margin of autonomy 
in framing their legal systems. Consequently, the application of valued-laden provisions - like Article 
2 TEU - in political forums open the flank to criticism from populist governments as to the right 
interpretation of these values. Besides, the high threshold required in the context of Article 7 TEU 
procedure and the lack of sanctioning instruments in the Commission Rule of Law framework, de-
prive the two instruments of meaningful effects.  
2) The most effective strategy EU institutions can deploy to limit the rise of populist parties in Mem-
ber States is one focused on reinforcing the national democratic institutions, and in particular the 
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judiciary. In order to safeguard the national judiciary amidst the rule of law crisis all tools available 
to the Commission and the ECJ must be used in order to make sure that no irreversible damage to the 
judiciary occurs. In this framework, the infringement procedure, combined with the operativisation 
of Article 19 TEU, remains the most effective enforcement mechanism which provides a solution to 
existing problems. This could entail a combined use of the expedited or accelerated procedure,102 
interim measures103 (the value-based approach). This approach combined with accelerated procedure 
and interim measures could enhance the effectiveness of the infringement procedure and make it the 
most viable solution in the ongoing ‘rule of law crisis’. 
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3. Judicial Populism  
 
3.1 Conceptual clarification and scope of the examination 
 
Populist actors, considered either as representatives of a specific ideology or specialists of a commu-
nication style, often refer to the popular will or popular feeling as the ultimate orientating point of 
decisions which affect the community. That is why the populist expectation as regards tribunals is 
that judges show empathy in their decisions towards the people’s will they claim to embed;104even if 
these decisions are in conflict with the textual meaning of laws, the established judicial practice or 
the constitutional principles of the legal system. 
 
The role of extra-legal factors in judicial decisions is an evergreen topic in the theory of adjudication. 
A judicial approach that takes the consequences of the decision (such as the reaction of the public or 
the expectations of politicians) into consideration in adjudication is commonly identified as pragma-
tism. However, we have to make a clear distinction between judicial populism and pragmatism.  
 
One similarity between the two approaches is that both focus on the social impact of the decision and 
neither care much about its legal correctness or its compatibility with fundamental legal values. A 
pragmatist judge considers it more important to adequately reflect the social needs behind the law. 
Several representatives of the pragmatist approach have a clear concept of the social function of law 
that adjudication should serve.105 These versions of judicial decision-making can be called ‘reflective 
pragmatism’, since one may discover a more or less coherent ideology, which drives them in a series 
of judgments.  
While reflective pragmatists see judicial power as a means to achieve a certain social aim and are 
sensitive to the long-term consequences of the judgment, a populist judge does not reflect on the 
deeper social consequences of his or her decision. As for judicial populism, one of its essential fea-
tures is that judges deciding certain cases feel bound by the views and sentiments of the ‘ordinary 
man or woman’. What matters for a populist judge is the popular reaction to the judicial decision.  
 
 
To sum up, when a judge deliberately breaches the standards of proper legal reasoning in order to 
satisfy the presumed expectations of ‘ordinary people’, this can be considered a manifestation of 
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judicial populism. This definition excludes from the concept of judicial populism cases where the 
populist ruling majority makes laws fit its agenda and judges simply apply these laws without chal-
lenging them. This legalistic form of adjudication can be defined as bureaucratic or technocratic ra-
ther than populist. It is safe to say that bureaucratic judges also apply the laws made by a non-populist 
legislature smoothly . 
 
Another distinction is that the decisions of judges appointed by or courts packed by a populist gov-
ernment whose aim is to change the established judicial practice are also not included in the concept 
of judicial populism. The reason for that is that in these cases judges are not autonomous public actors, 
their activities are controlled by politicians.106 These judges can be the supporters of a populist polit-
ical regime, but they serve the political leader(s) and not the ‘people’.107 That is why the examination 
of judicial populism is a meaningful enterprise only in political systems where judges have some 
autonomy. 
 
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that judicial formalism manifests itself in two forms. On the one 
hand, it can take the form of ‘honest populism’, where a judge truly believes that he or she has to take 
into consideration the interests and opinion of ordinary people.108 On the other hand, populism serves 
as a kind of judicial strategy, where judges follow a purpose by applying this strategy, which can be 
clearly distinguished from the purpose of satisfying public needs and sentiments. ‘Strategic popu-
lism’, for example, may serve as a ‘shield’ that can help judges, in uncertain political circumstances, 
to secure their institutional position through the external support of the public sphere.109 
 
The question whether courts can be effective defenders of liberal democracy against a populist tide 
is also a subject of scholarly examination. The DEMOS project will scrutinise the conditions and 
opportunities of courts’ resistance to the populist pressure in WP 7.5, whilst WP 6.1 focuses on the 
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above-outlined phenomenon of judicial populism. In the investigation of judicial populism two re-
search methods have been applied. Besides studying and analysing the relevant literature, the research 
relied also on opinions from national experts of EU member states collected with the questionnaire, 
in particular Q 13 and 15. 
 
3.2 Judicial Populism in constitutional courts  
 
As elucidated above,110 given their nature as a constraint on the ruling majority, constitutional courts 
are among the institutions most frequently put under stress by populist governments. In legal schol-
arship, a number of works illustrate the attacks on constitutional courts by populist and illiberal gov-
ernments,111 as well as the EU reaction to those attacks.112 The focus of the present Section is instead 
on how and if the case law of constitutional courts is influenced by the rise of populism. In fact, while 
there are a number of studies in political science on the role of judicial actors in authoritarian re-
gimes,113 a comprehensive analysis of populism in constitutional courts from a legal point of view, 
seems to be lacking. In order to assess the changes in constitutional jurisprudence, the researchers 
relied on the questionnaire distributed in the context of WP 2, and in particular on question n. 13.114 
 
Before embarking in this analysis some preliminary considerations about the role of judicial review 
of legislation in constitutional democracies are in order. In the previous pages, we mentioned how an 
activist constitutional court, not showing deference towards the ruling majority, has become a com-
mon feature of the European model of constitutional democracy. Yet, some constitutional scholars, 
especially from the North American tradition,115 have raised objections against a supposedly exces-
sive judicial activism by constitutional jurisdictions. According to this tradition, which is commonly 
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referred to as ‘political constitutionalism’, judicial actors in a functioning constitutional democracy 
defer to the political powers when it comes to the fundamental decisions that regulate society.116 
 
In this light, the far reaching reforms of the design and powers of constitutional courts in Hungary 
and Poland,117 have been considered an attempt ‘to take the constitution seriously and return it to the 
citizens’.118 Lamenting the juridification of politics operated by constitutional courts, populist gov-
ernments do indeed identify constitutional courts as obstacles to the new prevailing views and ideas 
in society and advocate constitutional courts more open to changes, and thus more flexible Constitu-
tions. Emblematic is the case of Spain, where pro Catalan secession politicians take a similar point 
of view and criticise the intervention of the Constitutional Tribunal in politics,119 particularly since 
the latter’s declaration of unconstitutionality of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia in judgment 
31/2010.120 
 
On the contrary, many scholars, belonging to the tradition of ‘legal constitutionalism’,121 consider the 
functions performed by populist-reformed constitutional courts radically incompatible with constitu-
tional democracy.122 Their main argument is that constitutional courts are reduced to devices in the 
hands of populist governments which serve the purpose of formally allowing the ruling majority to 
circumvent the constitutional text. This results in the complete loss of the constitution’s normativity 
thus undermines the very foundations of the rule of law in these countries.123  
 
Although the present Section deals mainly with constitutional courts in populist regimes, the impact 
of populism on constitutional jurisdictions is visible, to a lesser extent, also in legal systems that 
cannot be classified as populist ruled. In this regard we can observe two tendencies.  
On the one hand, it is a commonplace in constitutional scholarship that in the last decade, as a con-
sequence of the financial crisis that hit Europe in 2010, constitutional courts have practised self-
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120 See also above: Section 1.4. 
121 Francisco Javier Pérez Royo, La STC 31/2010 y la contribución de la jurisprudencia constitucional a la configuración 
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restraint on the legislation adopted to face the financial emergency.124 Besides, countries like Italy 
and Spain,125 have a long-standing problem with governmental abuse of Law Decrees, a problem 
exacerbated during an emergency situation, and that contributes to a further narrowing down of the 
extent of the scrutiny by constitutional courts on the actions of the ruling majority. 
 
On the other hand, it appears that constitutional courts in Western democracies are more aware of the 
necessity to enhance their democratic legitimacy in the public eye. An example is provided by the 
Italian Constitutional Court, which in January 2020 modified its rule of procedure to relax the criteria 
for standing in incidental proceedings and allow the submission of amicus curiae.126 This being said, 
it is possible to move on to assess the role of constitutional courts in populist regimes through the 
prism of their case law. 
 
In order to do that, the researchers relied on the answers to the questionnaire drafted in WP 2.4, in 
particular Q. 13. The answers to this question illustrate the tendencies in the last 10 years, but it is 
almost impossible to make predictions for the future. The reason for that is that small changes in the 
composition of a constitutional court can result in sharp turns in its jurisprudence. Political and other 
crises can also lead to departures from the established case law of a court. 
 
The first observation, based on the answers, is that two kinds of populism exist in the context of the 
jurisprudence of constitutional courts. One of them is that a court follows a populist agenda in decid-
ing certain issues. In this case the source of the motivation of judges can stem from their own 
worldview or from external pressure directly from the populace (often strengthened or generated by 
the media). This can be called ‘direct judicial populism’ where the court tries to gain more legitimacy 
by taking popular convictions and/or ‘the interest of ordinary people’ into consideration in their de-
cision-making.  
 
Certain judgments of French and Irish courts in immigration policy cases can be interpreted in this 
manner. Courts, in accordance with the public mood, approved the more restrictive measures of gov-
ernments towards foreigners. The Portuguese and the Latvian courts impinged on governments that 
                                                 
125For a comprehensive assessment of the financial crisis effects on the European constitutions see: Xenophon Contiades 
(ed.). Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis, Routledge, 2013, in particular 10-242. 
126 For Italy see amongst many: Valeria Piergigli, Le Regole della produzione normativa, Giappichelli, 2009; specifically 
on governmental lawmaking during the financial crisis: Roberta Calvano, La crisi e la produzione normativa del Governo 
nel periodo 2011-2013. Riflessioni critiche, Osservatorio sulle Fonti 3 (2013): 1-24.; for Spain: Ana María Carmona 
Contreras, Articulo 86, in Carmen Montesinos Padilla, Pablo Perez Tremps and Alejandro Saíz Arnaiz (eds.), Comentario 
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127 See Articles 4-bis and 4-ter, Rules of Procedure of the Italian Constitutional Courts.
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adopted laws to attain fiscal sustainability by reducing welfare costs. At the same time, the latter court 
supports nationalist legislation against an ethnic (Russian) minority.  
 
The other manifestation of populism is where a court defers to a populist government and decides 
cases in favour of the government even if these decisions are definitely anti-populist in their outcome 
(‘indirect judicial populism’). A good example here is the Romanian Constitutional Court, which has 
become subordinate to the populist government and made rulings in which it relaxed the criminal 
repression of corruption, which is certainly an anti-populist step, but it served the interests of the 
government perfectly. It seems that Hungarian and Polish courts also defer more to their populist 
governments than to citizens. 
 
Of course, in the examination of the practice of courts sometimes it is hard to unfold the real motives 
behind a decision (e.g. it is difficult to determine whether these motives are stemming from the pop-
ulist sentiments of judges, the enormous pressure from the public or from deference to the govern-
ment). 
 
The second observation is that there is a sharp difference in the character of judicial populism between 
constitutional courts of ‘stable’ and (relatively) ‘new’ democracies. In courts of the former countries 
the signs of populism are rather sporadic and limited only to certain issues, such as immigration 
policy. This is the case in Ireland and France where courts are generally consistent defenders of hu-
man rights, but in cases relating to foreigners they show some deference to a restrictive governmental 
policy. It must be noted that other courts in Western-Europe go openly against anti-migrants and other 
populist laws adopted by the ruling majority (Austria, Belgium, UK, Sweden) even if they could 
easily become victims of a fierce attack coming from the public and/or the media (a telling example 
is the media reaction to the Brexit-decision of the Supreme Courts of England and Wales). 
 
On the contrary, in Central and Eastern European countries, where judicial populism exists, it takes 
a systemic shape. Romanian, Hungarian and Polish courts systematically rule in favour of populist 
governments in almost every politically sensitive case. The difference between the three countries is 
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that while in Poland and Hungary the populist turn was achieved by court packing, in Romania the 
populist shift ‘came without any packing, reshuffling or visible political pressure’.127  
 
This is not to say that judicial populism is the ‘historical fate’ of these countries. The Lithuanian, 
Czech and Slovakian courts strongly resist populist governments and there are countries (Croatia and 
Bulgaria), where courts have not yet decided in cases where they would have been exposed to populist 
pressure. 
 
Finally, some of the experts call attention to the paradox of judicial fight against populism: promoting 
a consistent human rights-centred approach, anti-populist agenda in sensitive cases by courts 
(LGBTQ rights, prisoner voting etc.), can actually decrease the level of trust towards courts and fuel 
populist sentiments. 
 
 
3.3. Everyday judicial populism  
 
Legal scholarship tends to concentrate on the landmark judgments of constitutional and apex courts 
in terms of judicial populism. The phenomenon of ‘everyday judicial populism’ where ordinary courts 
decide cases in a way that they think will please the populace is essentially overlooked. Some authors, 
e.g. Smilov, mention the extremely high conviction rate in Bulgaria as a sign of judicial populism 
(penal populism), but without supporting this hypothesis with relevant facts.128 That is not to deny 
the importance of decisions of apex courts (rather to put emphasis on lower court judges who can 
also be susceptible to the populist Zeitgeist. The examination of the activities of ordinary courts 
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128 Daniel Smilov, supra fn 108, 
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(whether or not ‘everyday judicial populism’ exists) is of great importance as they shape the lives of 
citizens and can strengthen or curb populist politics. 
 
The second observation was that judicial populism is typically researched intensively in common law 
legal systems such as the US, India and Pakistan,129 and in Latin American countries.130The sensitiv-
ity of common law legal cultures to the phenomenon of judicial populism can be explained by the 
fact that common law judges are considered organic parts of political life (in the US, for example, 
some states even provide for judges to be elected by the people).131 In Latin America, where democ-
racies are weak and political populism has a long tradition,132 it is no surprise that courts are affected 
by populism. It is remarkable that in the European context there is no significant literature on the 
phenomenon of judicial populism, with the exception of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.133 Also 
taking into account the answers received to the questionnaire drafted in WP 2.4, it can be argued that 
that judiciaries of new and weak democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are more prone 
to populism than their Western counterparts. This can be connected to the strength of Rule of Law 
institutions in different regions of Europe, but a complete explanation would require further in-depth 
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legal-sociological investigation. Be that as it may, the next part of this chapter focuses on the existing 
form of ‘everyday judicial populism’ in some CEE countries.  
 
 
3.4 Characteristics of judicial populism in CEE countries134 
 
Being aware of the fact that some populist judicial decisions can be delivered at almost any time and 
in every legal system,135 Central and Eastern European legal systems, as was discussed above, we 
show a greater intensity of populist judgments than in Western ones.136 Hungary has seen a series of 
court decisions that clearly show the signs of the populist mentality of judges, while in Bulgaria the 
newly elected Prosecutor General seems to follow a classic populist agenda (‘sheriff of the peo-
ple’).137 The question is, therefore, what the specificities of the CEE form of judicial populism are. 
 
1) The first characteristic of judicial populism in CEE countries is that the judges, although they use 
legal arguments, do not provide their judgments with sufficient reasoning, in other words, they do not 
present a transparent, coherent and convincing explanation for why they emphasised one of the rea-
sons and not some others in the decision-making process (strategic use of the formalist model of 
adjudication).138 Judges in decisions affected by populism significantly limit the number of adequate 
legal reasons, that is, they did not take their professional obligations seriously.139 
 
Thus, insufficient judicial reasoning can be an indicator that the judge follows a hidden agenda, such 
as populism (the judge uses ‘token’ legal arguments in order to hide his or her real motives behind 
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the decision). That is why a group of legal scholars launched a research project in order to determine 
the quality criteria of judicial reasoning. They have elaborated some quality indicators, which can 
show whether a judicial decision deviates from the rules of proper justification.140 Testing judicial 
decisions against these indicators can help to identify the suspicious judgment which then can be 
subjected to an in-depth analysis.  
 
2)Based on the experiences of CEE countries, populist judges tend to adopt a clear majority-protec-
tive legal position. In hate crimes cases141, for example, Hungarian justice has more frequently found 
Romany people guilty than non-Romany ones.142 Paradoxically, the objective of the legislation which 
introduced hate crime into the Penal Code was to protect vulnerable minorities.143 In the field of 
sentencing a significant bias can also be detected, especially in murder cases. It seems that many 
judges tend to impose severe sentences on perpetrators coming from ethnic minorities. On the other 
hand, judges are usually more lenient when it comes to crimes committed against ethnic minorities.144 
Once again, this phenomenon is particularly visible in Hungary. On the one hand, hate crimes com-
mitted against non-Romany people almost always receive nation-wide publicity; on the other hand, 
a survey conducted by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee did not find any difference in sentencing 
between Romany and non-Romany perpetrators in robbery cases which did not trigger a ‘threshold 
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stimulus’ for the national media.145 This fact seems to support the hypothesis that the populist ap-
proach and not racism is responsible for numerous judicial miscarriages in Hungary.  
 
According to the latest report of World Justice Project146 the practice of criminal justice is more dis-
criminatory towards minorities in CEE Member States (in Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Hun-
gary and Slovenia) which have significantly larger ethnic minorities than the EU average 
 
Beside criminal cases, in Hungary, traces of judicial populism are visible in other branches of adju-
dication as well. Scrutinising the published civil or administrative court verdicts from the past 15 
years we cannot find — with one exception — any cases where any fundamental rights would have 
overridden the right to religious freedom or religious sentiments in cases where one of the parties was 
the Catholic Church. It is an important feature of all these cases that the legal correctness of the 
judgments was highly controversial.147 According to the results of the last two censuses, it is clear 
that the majority of Hungarian society identifies itself as Roman Catholic. A plausible explanation of 
the legally arguable decisions therefore is the pro-majoritarian populism of the courts. 
 
3) In the beginning of the working paper a distinction was made between ‘honest’ and ‘strategic’ 
populism. In CEE countries the latter is predominant. In order to prove this hypothesis, we need to 
turn to public choice theory, and consider courts as players in the arena of politics, who tend to enforce 
their institutional interests by applying various strategies. For example, in the case of Hungary it is 
possible that courts use a populist strategy in some cases as a means of fulfilling their institutional 
purposes, because political populism in Hungary has become stronger over the past few years. There 
are many unambiguous examples of the application of this political strategy. Criminal legislation in 
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the past ten years has followed a ‘classic’ populist agenda.148 One of the first moves the new govern-
ment took in 2010 was to enact the notorious ‘three strikes’ provision in the Penal Code.149 A parlia-
mentary majority then implemented an American style ‘lawful defence’, which made the murder of 
a trespasser legal under certain circumstances.150 Following this, the Hungarian government declared 
it would uphold the literal ‘life’ imprisonment against a consolidated jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which qualifies life sentencing as an inhuman and degrading punishment.151 
Recently, Hungarian legislation has criminalised some forms of help for asylum seekers and home-
lessness.152  
 
This may generate a similar attitude on the part of the judiciary (those who have an inclination to be 
populist), implying that a good judge serves the people rather than being a black-letter lawyer. As the 
ruling majority is doing the same thing in the field of politics and legislation (e.g. ‘getting tough on 
crime’) many judges may feel their populism justified. They may think that they can only win if they 
follow governmental strategy.  
 
The fact that the level of the perceived judicial independence is lower in CEE countries than in other 
EU countries (with the exception of Italy and Spain) can strengthen the tendency of strategic use of 
judicial populism in the CEE countries.153 The reason for that is that lower level of perceived judicial 
independence leads to lower level of public trust towards courts, which is why judges may try in-
creasing their legitimacy by rendering ‘popular’ judgments. 
 
4) Judicial populism in its strategic form represents a danger to judicial independence, as a strong 
political party or a government can manipulate the public mood in many ways according to its own 
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political agenda.154 Thus, a clever populist government can exercise undue influence on courts in an 
indirect form. A good illustration of this manipulation is a Hungarian judgment where one of the 
reasons for the harsh sentence was that the accident caused huge public outcry.155 In fact, this huge 
public outcry was largely generated by the government through the media and the decision supported 
the ‘tough on crime’ and anti-elitist rhetoric of the government. Most recently in Hungary the gov-
ernment has launched a fierce media campaign against judges who (on the basis of the law adopted 
by the Fidesz-led parliament) ordered the state to pay compensation for Romany people and prisoners 
whose human rights were violated by the state.156 In Bulgaria a parole decision caused a huge public 
outcry and steps were taken against presiding judges.157 Such campaigns can further incentivise 
judges to render judgments that are in accordance with the attitude of the ordinary people towards 
unpopular social groups (convicted persons, ethnic minorities). 
 
5) Two factors have contributed to the emergence of judicial populism in CEE, which are well-known 
in the other parts of the world as well. These are the ‘politicisation’ and ‘mediatisation’ of adjudica-
tion. As to the former, with increasing frequency over the past three decades sensitive political cases 
have been brought before courts.158 Moreover, in some — mostly criminal — cases, court judgments 
have themselves acquired political significance. In these cases, judges can suffer from indirect pres-
sure from the strongest political group. 
 
Since the early nineties the media have also paid increasing attention to court trials, and court trials 
have been more and more frequently broadcast. Some interesting cases are watched by tens of mil-
lions of viewers on a daily basis in the form of a TV show. The presence of journalists and TV 
cameras may have an impact on the behaviour of judges.159 It has already been detected that in some 
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countries court decisions are sometimes influenced by popular sentiment.160 In CEE countries these 
tendencies have also occurred over the past fifteen years, creating the preconditions for the emergence 
of judicial populism. However, it must be emphasised, that judicial populism does not affect the en-
tirety of the judicial system, as it ultimately concerns each individual judge. There are court rulings, 
even in Hungary, that go against the governmental will or pressure from the public.161 
 
3.5 The evaluation of judicial populism 
 
One cannot say that populism is an inherently negative phenomenon that we should expel from all 
spheres of public life. We have gathered some arguments pro and contra judicial populism.  
First, it is commonplace that established judicial practices need external challenges from time to time 
in order to be able to renew themselves. Adjudication has to reflect social needs and the requirements 
of the zeitgeist also have to be followed (the most prominent example being the US Supreme Court 
landmark judgment Brown v. Board of Education).162 On the other hand, the populist approach over-
simplifies legal-doctrinal questions and makes the law primitive and incapable of responding to the 
needs of a complex society.  
 
Secondly, populism builds the image of the ‘good court’, and in this way it generates public trust in 
the justice system. However, at the same time, it violates the principles of the rule of law and equality. 
Thus, it may have a detrimental effect on the justice system in the long run. 
 
Thirdly, lay justice is an organic part of justice systems almost everywhere in the world. The populist 
approach may substitute the merely formal lay participation by embedding lay attitudes in the men-
talities of professional judges. Nonetheless, it is the first order duty of professional judges to enforce 
the internal values of the law, rather than ignore them. That is why we cannot find ‘pure’ lay justice 
systems anywhere in the modern world. It would be important to learn from the experience of coun-
tries with well-functioning mixed justice systems where lay judges can work together with profes-
sional judges. In such systems the effective participation of lay people can increase the level of public 
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trust through the representation of ordinary people in the judicial process, while professional judges 
could concentrate on the legal aspects of the cases brought before the court. 
 
Besides these reasons, there are two general objections against the populist judicial approach. First, 
popular wishes sometimes simply do not deserve to be fulfilled; the question of what qualifies as 
right or wrong in a moral sense cannot be answered by referring to the majority’s opinion (the moral-
philosophical argument). Second, the ‘will of the people’, or the ‘sentiment of the public’ etc. are 
confusing concepts. It is very difficult to obtain well-grounded empirical data on them (the sociolog-
ical argument). 
 
In conclusion, these arguments show that ordinary people may have their say in justice administration 
but not in a crude manner. The legislator and professional judges should filter the ‘will of the people’. 
Actually, these institutions are designed to tackle this task. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
1) Early recognition of judicial populism is of great importance. Although it seems that Western 
European countries are not (yet) infected with populism, a questionnaire should be made which can 
detect populist tendencies. The questionnaire should be sent to legal/court experts. Questions would 
be as follows: 
 
1) Are there legally controversial judicial decisions in favour of powerful organisations, social groups or popular 
political parties? 
2) Is judicial bias toward public opinion detectable in cases that draw media interest? 
3) If these kinds of decisions (populist decisions) exist, do they form a trend or are they detectable only in isolated 
cases? 
4) Do courts in politically sensitive cases take into consideration the reception of their judgement when making 
their decision? 
5) Does an effective lay justice system exist in your country? 
 
Other questions related to judicial populism that may be included are: ‘Are there judgments which 
are discriminative because, for example, they impose harsher punishment on members of unpopular 
minorities than on the members of the majority?’ or ‘What is the level of public trust towards courts 
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in a certain country?’) which can be answered by studying reports and surveys of international or-
ganisations.163 
 
2) The institutionalised quality control of the justification of judgments could make it hard for judges 
to follow a hidden agenda such as populism in their decisions. This is because populist decisions are 
often wrapped in camouflage legal argumentation. Because of the importance of judicial independ-
ence, the quality control of judicial argumentation is a very sensitive topic. To avoid problems related 
to populist-controlled judicial councils, this should be introduced only in a decentralised way and 
quality indicators should be as objective as possible and clearly formulated. 
 
3) Although the pure form of lay justice is neither possible, nor desirable in a modern justice system, 
the effective participation of lay people in the administration of justice can decrease the efficiency of 
populist demagoguery against courts and improve democratic efficacy, thus rendering it much harder 
for populists to depict courts as institutions of the elite. Besides this, there is a danger that in lieu of 
effective lay participation, professional judges may feel a temptation to serve the demands of the 
populace directly at the expense of their professional duties, including the unbiased application of 
law and defending civil liberties. 
 
4) It would be the task of legal education to present legal institutions together with their social con-
texts. Deeper knowledge of the social backgrounds of legal problems can defend judges from cheap 
demagoguery, which identifies the deference to the momentary mood of the public (generated by the 
media or the government) with sensitivity to serious social issues. 
 
5) Courts themselves should communicate their judgements in a way that is comprehensible to the 
public, especially in cases that receive nation-wide publicity.  
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48 
4. Policy Recommendations  
 
In light of the analytical research conducted and taking into account the answers to the questionnaire 
received from EU Member States, it is possible to formulate some preliminary policy recommenda-
tions. It is important to note, however, that the legal and political reactions to be given to the rise of 
populist parties will be specifically developed in the project work package 7.  
Concerning non-majoritarian institutions, we can affirm that: 
i) in order to reduce the impact of a prolonged populist rule on the independence of judges and 
administrative authorities, it is recommended to involve a plurality of institutional actors in their 
appointment. As shown by the Czech case, where the judiciary — thanks to its systems of ap-
pointment which provides for the involvement of the judges, the Parliament and the President of 
the Republic in the Judicial Council — appears to have better resisted the populist tide that only 
Parliamentary election of the Council — the participation of different actors in the appointment 
of judges makes it harder for populist parties to pack courts, especially higher ones.  
ii) concerning constitutional courts, it is recommended to preserve their role as supreme interpreters 
of the constitution. More specifically, the constitutional court’s competences should be clearly 
defined by the constitution and the law, and any attempt to narrow it down should be avoided. 
Another tool to empower constitutional courts vis-à-vis a populist ruling majority may be confer-
ring on them an explicit power of reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional amendments, at 
least with regard to the procedures followed for constitutional revision. In any case, any provision 
enhancing the rigidity of the constitution, such as an eternity clause on the model of Article 79(3) 
of the German Grundgesetz — shall be particularly welcomed, as it eliminates the risk of the 
constitution being reduced to an instrument of everyday politics. Besides, Constitutional Courts 
should seek to establish more firmly their social legitimacy, for example, by loosening the rules 
for standing — as was recently done by the Italian Constitutional court — especially in countries 
where access to constitutional justice is narrow and adopting transparency rules for the proceed-
ings and judgments. 
iii) with respect to the role of parliaments, it appears that a weak representative assembly provides 
the ideal terrain for the growth of populist parties. Also, populist parties, once in power, tend to reduce 
the effective decision-making power of the parliament. Thus, all reforms seeking to reduce the num-
ber of MPs; to abolish the upper House; or to strip away competences from legislative assemblies, 
shall indicate populist influence. Conversely, as evidenced in the project deliverable report D2.2 (see 
working paper On the Institutional Context of Populism on the DEMOS website, it is advisable to 
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enact reforms that enhance the parliament’s representativeness, for instance by reducing the size of 
constituencies and/or allowing the voters to express their preferences for the candidates, and, espe-
cially in parliamentarian systems, its supervisory power over the government.  
iv) As for the EU, the most effective strategy available for EU institutions to halt democratic erosion 
in Member States is to reinforce national democratic institutions, and in particular the judiciary, rather 
than trying to impose EU values through dialogues, as envisaged by the Rule of Law Framework. 
Among the tools available to the Commission and the ECJ, the most effective to enforce compliance 
with rule-of-law values, seems to be the infringement procedure pursuant to Article 258 TFEU. 
v) Concerning judicial populism in ordinary courts, the effective participation of lay people in the 
administration of justice may be a useful way to decrease the efficacy of populist rhetoric depicting 
courts as elitist institutions. In this regard, the French Cour d’assises and the Italian Corte d’assise, 
where lay people compose the bench integrated by professional judges when adjudicating most seri-
ous crimes, can be taken as a blueprint for a reform of the judiciary aiming at enhancing the trust of 
citizens towards judges without lowering the standards of legal reasoning. 
vi) Also, the possibility of introducing institutionalised quality control for judicial argumentation may 
be considered, as this may prevent judges from following populist agendas. In order to minimise the 
populist impact on the independence of each individual judge, any form of control should be intro-
duced only in a decentralised way and the quality indicators should be as objective as possible and 
clearly formulated. 
